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Frieda Vandeninden and Elisabeth Paul∗ 
 
‘Transaction costs’ are commonly referred to in the recent literature on 
aid effectiveness. Aid transaction costs, however, have been neither 
consistently defined nor measured. This article defines aid transaction 
costs as all the economic costs associated with aid management that add 
no value to aid delivery. This enables the ‘net’ transaction costs that 
should be minimised to be identified. An analytical framework is then 
developed for assessing these costs. This allows the effectiveness of 
different aid modalities to be compared, according to the characteristics of 
the aid transaction. The article shows that the choice of aid modality 
should depend on these characteristics and, therefore, that the 
minimisation of transaction costs should not be an end in itself. 
 





Since the 1990s, there has been a growing debate about the effectiveness of 
development aid. A wide body of empirical literature has been written about the impact 
of aid on poverty reduction and growth (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Easterly et al., 
2003). However, there is still no clear-cut conclusion as to the relative (in)effectiveness 
of aid: although most scholars agree that aid has surprisingly little impact on 
development, there is no consensual explanation for its ineffectiveness. For a long time, 
some economists have claimed that the major causes of aid ineffectiveness were weak 
institutional capacities and inappropriate policy environment in the recipient countries 
(Burnside and Dollar, 2000). However, as this hypothesis is very deterministic (it would 
imply that aid should be given only to recipient countries with ‘good enough’ policies if 
donors want it to be efficient), the international community and aid practitioners have 
also questioned existing aid-delivery mechanisms and aid modalities. In particular, 
some major problems associated with traditional co-operation instruments – namely, 
projects and structural adjustment programmes – have been identified.1 Major criticisms 
of these modalities deal with the lack of coherence between donors’ policies as well as 
with recipient countries’ own policies and systems; the fragmentation and duplication of 
donor projects; the lack of ownership and leadership by recipient countries; and the lack 
of long-term effects of projects on local institutions’ capacities (World Bank, 1998). 
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1. See Foster and Leavy (2001) for a review of the financial aid instruments and World Bank (1998) and 
Bourguignon and Sundberg (2007) for the debate on aid effectiveness. 
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To respond to these criticisms, what can be described as a new aid paradigm has 
been built around a set of pillars: partnership and participation, ownership of 
development strategies by domestic constituencies, alignment of donors on domestic 
policies and systems, co-ordination and harmonisation between donors, results 
orientation and mutual accountability (Paul, 2002). The development community and a 
number of recipient countries have committed to respecting these principles in 
delivering and managing aid by signing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 
2005, and have confirmed that willingness by signing the Accra Agenda for Action in 
2008 (see http://www.aideffectiveness.org). 
The new aid paradigm and its pillars are notably supposed to enhance aid 
effectiveness by reducing the costs arising from multiple and unco-ordinated donor 
practices (OECD, 2003). Aid practitioners often refer to these so-called aid transaction 
costs to explain the poor aid effectiveness and to justify the necessity to change the aid-
delivery system. As pointed by Acharya et al. (2006: 7), ‘[t]here are very strong reasons 
to believe that, all other considerations aside, aid often underperforms because it flows 
through too many institutional channels. This generates high transactions costs within 
each recipient nation, and so reduces the value of aid.’ This issue is becoming more and 
more problematic due to rising aid fragmentation (Knack and Rahman, 2004). 
Thus the reduction of aid-transaction costs has been one of the major motivations 
behind the shift in the aid-delivery system (see Section 2), and many efforts have been 
made to reduce them, implicitly assuming that this would improve aid effectiveness. As 
a matter of fact, many international debates on developmental assistance have centred 
on the issue of transaction costs. It has often been agreed that high transaction costs may 
cause Official Development Assistance (ODA) to underperform in several respects: (i) 
through influencing the volume of aid delivered, by discouraging donors and 
governments from entering into agreements, and reducing disbursement rates; (ii) 
through reducing aid efficiency, by consuming donor and government resources that 
could be otherwise employed and misallocating the resources made available under aid 
agreements; and (iii) through reducing aid effectiveness, by encouraging donors and 
recipient governments to allocate resources to activities that do not address development 
priorities and, in some cases, undermine institutional development goals (UNDP and 
DFID, 2000, §27). 
Yet, we have not found any satisfying definition, typology or measurement of aid 
transactions costs in the literature. Quoting Acharya et al. (2006: 7) ‘[n]o one has ever 
measured them. It is not clear that they are measurable.’ Definitions found in the 
literature rest on no theoretical grounds and may actually lead to misinterpretations. The 
first point of this article is thus to review the current use and definitions of aid 
transaction costs. 
The article intends to address two issues. After showing that the notion of aid 
transaction costs in the literature is quite indistinct, our first aim is to put forward a 
satisfying definition of these costs. To do so, we have chosen to examine the aid 
transaction from the perspective of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Section 3). In 
doing so, we show that account should be taken of the characteristics of the aid 
transaction before arguing that one particular aid modality could reduce transaction 
costs. The theoretical background exposed in Sections 3 and 4 allows proposing a 
definition that avoids possible confusion between costs of different kinds. 
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The second issue addressed is whether a change in aid modality is worthwhile, in 
terms of reducing transaction costs. As shown in Section 4, the transaction 
characteristics should be taken into account before arguing that one aid modality is 
more efficient than another. We therefore develop a simple model that relates costs and 
different characteristics, and enables assessing whether one modality should be replaced 
by another, according to the specific characteristics of the aid transaction considered. 
Finally, Subsection 4.3 discusses the minimisation of transaction costs and argues that 
this should not be an end in itself, because aid effectiveness does not necessarily imply 
low transaction costs. 
 
2 Transaction costs viewed by aid practitioners 
 
The international community is now generally aware of the problem of transaction 
costs. For instance, the Monterrey Conference of 2002 specifically called on 
development-co-operation agencies to intensify their efforts to ‘harmonize their 
operational procedures at the highest standard so as to reduce transaction costs and 
make ODA disbursement and delivery more flexible’ (United Nations, 2002). The 
Rome Declaration on Harmonization (see www.aideffectiveness.org) signed in 2003 
states that: ‘We in the donor community have been concerned with the growing 
evidence that, over time, the totality and wide variety of donor requirements and 
processes for preparing, delivering, and monitoring development assistance are 
generating unproductive transaction costs for, and drawing down the limited capacity 
of, partner countries’ (High Level Forum, 2003). The Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness notably encourages donors to untie aid because it ‘generally increases aid 
effectiveness by reducing transaction costs for partner countries’ (High Level Forum, 
2005: §31), and notes that ‘[e]xcessive fragmentation of aid at global, country or sector 
level impairs aid effectiveness. A pragmatic approach to the division of labour and 
burden sharing increases complementarity and can reduce transaction costs’ (ibid.), 
Recent efforts to improve aid effectiveness rest on improving donor co-ordination, 
harmonisation and alignment in national systems, as well as on concentrating and 
delegating aid, so as to reduce aid transaction costs (for example, OECD, 2003, 2006; 
EuropeAid, 2007). To this end, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2003) suggests that, as a 
first step, donors should simplify and harmonise their procedures, align them on partner 
systems, and be more transparent. Then, additional ways of reducing transaction costs 
could be streamlining conditionality, rationalising fiduciary assessments, aligning 
processes, tapping the potential of joint donor frameworks, and timing disbursements to 
facilitate the smooth execution of budgetary payments (OECD, 2006: 29-31). 
Concretely, transaction costs may also decrease when donors channel aid funds through 
national procedures, especially through sector-wide approaches (SWAps) and budget 
support (OECD, 2003, 2006; EC, 2007). 
From the above examples, one observes that the commitment of the international 
community to try to reduce transaction costs is undeniable. However, one should 
question more deeply what is intended to be reduced. What are transaction costs 
actually? How are they measured? Should they be reduced, and how? We first turn to 
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the grey literature issued from aid practitioners to assess their perspective on the matter. 
It is apparent that there is a lot of confusion and no agreement over a common definition 
of aid transaction costs. Moreover, measuring aid transaction costs appears to be an 
unachievable challenge. Then, we shall discuss what trends in transaction costs are 
expected to occur with a shift in aid modality (namely, from project to programme 
approach), even if evidence is mixed. 
 
2.1 Tentative definitions of transaction costs 
 
Aid practitioners commonly refer to transaction costs, but without defining them 
precisely. For instance, in its Guidelines on Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective 
Aid Delivery, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (2003: 114) 
identifies two types of costs in the aid relationship: 
 
• ‘Administrative costs of aid: this includes the costs of transferring aid from 
donors to recipients and the costs of planning aid and monitoring its progress 
and impact. 
• Costs of forgone development of partner institutions: the efficiency losses (due 
to lowered morale and initiative and loss of scarce skills to donors’ parallel 
structures) associated with low ownership by government, when donors bypass 
government. The forgone development of partner institutions raises future 
transaction costs and encourages donors to continue working through parallel 
structures. …’ 
 
In a footnote to its ‘Guidelines on the Programming, Design and Management of 
General Budget Support’, the European Commission (2007: 19) states that 
‘[t]ransaction costs may be defined as the extra costs – beyond that of the aid itself – of 
delivering aid. These costs may be borne by the recipient, the donor, or by both. It may 
cover, for example, the money, time, inconvenience of identifying, negotiating, 
implementing, monitoring and evaluating aid delivery.’ 
In its Guidelines on Support to Sector Programmes, EuropeAid (2007: 27) 
provides some further explanations for understanding transaction costs. It specifies that:  
 
[t]ransaction costs occur at all stages of the aid management cycle, from the 
initial negotiation of aid through to disbursement, implementation (including 
procurement, construction, etc), and monitoring of the activities it finances. 
There may also be conversion costs in moving from one financing instrument 
to another and different elements of risk for different types of transaction. … 
Transaction costs are not a pure efficiency loss: the same activities that 
embody transaction costs may also have positive benefits (for example, 
learning from working groups, mitigating risks through fiduciary safeguards). 
Transaction costs are difficult to quantify, and there is much observer bias in 
their assessment … 
 
In a background paper for the World Development Report, Dyer (2005) assesses 
transaction costs in the education sector in Tanzania. She puts forward some working 
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definitions and distinguishes different kinds of aid transaction costs: (i) administrative 
costs, which refer largely to the costs in terms of meetings, reports, and arrangements 
for release and reporting of money and so on, which take up donor and government 
time; (ii) tying costs, which are not addressed explicitly in her paper, since they are 
negligible in comparison with other transaction costs; and (iii) fiscal costs, relating to 
financial flows and the use of different aid modalities. 
Recognising that the concept of aid transaction costs has hardly been defined in the 
literature, Acharya et al. (2006: 7) make a conceptual contribution to the debate by 
suggesting that these transaction costs can be usefully divided into two categories: (i) 
direct transaction costs, that essentially take the form of the absorption of the scarce 
energies and attentions of relatively senior government staff by a multitude of projects, 
each of them requiring separate negotiation and distinct management and reporting 
requirements; and (ii) indirect transaction costs, that take the form of the dysfunctional 
bureaucratic and political behaviour that is stimulated by aid proliferation (for example, 
internal brain drain at the expense of government agencies, topping-up, distortion in the 
choice of projects, excessive expenditure on technical assistance, competition between 
donors inducing ‘hoarding’ of information, lack of a sense of responsibility for the 
outcomes of aid, etc.). 
A more recent tentative definition of aid transaction costs has been made by 
Lawson (2009). He defines them as ‘the costs necessary for an aid transaction to take 
place but which add nothing to the actual value of that transaction’. He identifies three 
cost categories: search costs (to identify partners and potential project or programme), 
bargaining and decision costs (to negotiate the financial agreements and expected 
outcomes) and policing and enforcement costs (to respect the monitoring and execution 
requirements imposed by donors, to monitor donors’ commitment and to supervise the 
project or programme conditions). 
 
2.2 Tentative measurement of aid transaction costs 
 
As there is no agreement over a common definition of aid transaction costs, the few 
tentative measurements of these costs have not succeeded. Aid transaction costs are 
particularly difficult to quantify, particularly since there is much observer bias in their 
assessment (EuropeAid, 2007: 27). Generally speaking, transaction costs are not usually 
effectively measured, but rather estimated – using proxy indicators to do so. 
For instance, a study undertaken in Vietnam, which originally had been conceived 
in order to quantify the transaction costs of managing aid through detailed survey 
questionnaires and interviews, had to acknowledge that: (i) it is very difficult to gather 
quantitative information on transaction costs, partly because there is no tested 
methodology available to measure them, and partly because availability of data was 
more limited than expected; and (ii) measuring transaction costs in itself incurs 
unacceptably high transaction costs (UNDP/DFID, 2000). Therefore, the approach 
adopted had to focus more on the qualitative aspects of transaction costs, and the debate 
moved on from what the transaction costs are to where they are incurred in the system, 
why they are incurred, and what could be done to reduce them. 
Similarly, Dyer (2005) attempted to quantify transaction costs, without success. 
She noted that almost all those interviewed complained about the high level of 
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transaction costs, but no one interviewed is actually trying to quantify them. She did, 
however, report a number of suggestions as to how transaction costs might be measured, 
including proxies such as the number of reports, missions, meetings, separate legal 
instruments, separate audit requirements, and number of staff (particularly sector 
specialists) required by donors. 
Amis et al. (2005) came to the conclusion that when the initial focus of trying to 
provide an overall quantitative measurement of transaction costs proved to be 
impractical, the emphasis shifted towards a more relative approach, ranking burdens of 
aid as perceived by recipient officials. This is the approach now used by the OECD’s 
DAC (2005). 
Watt (2005) adopted a relative approach and focused on measurement tools such 
as number of joint missions, numbers of donors that participate in the SWAp under 
study. Jobin also proposes an evaluation methodology for comparing transaction costs 
associated with two or more aid modalities, especially the ‘partnership’ one. As he 
mentioned, ‘Since TCs [transaction costs] are not directly measured but, rather, 
estimated (using the critical dimensions of a given transaction as proxies), it is sufficient 
to • nd a signi• cant relationship and variation between estimated TCs and a productivity 
index for a given partnership’ (Jobin, 2008: 442). To our knowledge, his methodology 
has neither been applied nor tested. 
 
2.3 Transaction costs and aid modalities 
 
Notwithstanding definition and measurement problems, as the OECD (2003: 114) 
concludes, ‘the objectives for aid costs are i) they should be low, and ii) they should 
result from carrying out administrative, planning and monitoring tasks in a way that 
helps the development of efficient systems for managing resources in partner countries.’ 
Different ways of managing aid may distribute transaction costs differently (for 
example, between international partners and government, between country offices and 
HQs, between finance ministries and sector ministries) (EuropeAid, 2007: 27). A series 
of good practices have been identified so as to reduce transaction costs, both at the 
macro level (such as improving medium-term resource planning by the government, and 
ensuring donors support this process; improving the quality of public expenditure 
information; improving donor co-ordination; consolidating projects) and at the project-
cycle management level (for example, improving the project identification and appraisal 
process by government, and ensuring support for this process by donors; addressing 
problems with project implementation, monitoring and evaluation which are partly 
caused by the project management unit structure; standardising procedures between 
government and donors; standardising procurement procedures and monitoring 
requirements) (UNDP/DFID, 2000). 
As already mentioned, the project approach to development co-operation has been 
notably criticised for encompassing very high transaction costs, all the more since the 
aid architecture is becoming more and more fragmented. In response to that criticism, it 
has been suggested that the so-called programme approach,2 especially as materialised 
                                                          
2. The programme approach or programme-based approach (PBA) has been defined by the Learning 
Network on Programme Based Approaches (LENPA) as ‘a way of engaging in development co-operation 
 Foreign Aid Transaction Costs: What Are They and When Are They Minimised? 7 
 
 
 © The Authors 2012. Development Policy Review © 2012 Overseas Development Institute. 
Development Policy Review 30 (3)  
through sector-wide approaches and budget support, could help to reduce transaction 
costs. However, this still has not been empirically established in any systematic way 
(Killick, 2004: 19) and anecdotal field experience is mixed. Martinez (2006) concludes 
that, as a result of the health SWAp in Mozambique, some transaction costs have been 
reduced, but others have either remained unchanged (those linked to disease 
interventions) or even increased (those linked to review processes and to the SWAp 
forum and its working groups). In addition, several donors continue to field separate 
missions for each of the sectors, which further increases transaction costs. He mentions 
that a recent report estimated no less than 143 missions to Mozambique by the main 
donors providing budget support during 2004-5, plus World Bank missions. 
Vandeninden (2005) also tried to evaluate the evolution of transaction costs in the 
health and education sectors in Mali since the introduction of a SWAp, mainly through 
qualitative data. Her results are mixed as well: some costs seem to have been reduced, 
but others have increased and new costs have appeared. The OECD (2003: 116) also 
notes that, in Tanzania, many donor representatives have expressed their concern about 
increasing transaction costs on their side due to the development and monitoring of 
SWAps and similar co-ordinated aid arrangements; however, these increased transaction 
costs should be compared with savings that may occur elsewhere. 
As for budget support, the use of domestic financial-management systems is expected 
to reduce transaction costs. However, if budget support is coupled with more complex 
management requirements and demands by donors for deeper reform and better reporting, 
transactions costs may change very little (OECD, 2003: 122). DFID reckons that:  
 
[a]lthough the transaction costs of budget support are likely to be higher in 
the short term, as new ways of working between governments and donors are 
established, net transaction costs should be lowered over the medium term. 
This is because donors should be using the government’s own reporting and 
accounting systems to monitor progress, rather than negotiating, managing 
and monitoring literally thousands of projects. … Preliminary evidence from 
Uganda indicates that transaction costs may have increased in the short run, 
as donors have yet to embed new ways of interacting with each other and 
with Government. However, there are reasonable prospects of a reduction in 
the medium term. (DFID, 2004:7)  
 
In fact, a reference evaluation of partnership global budget support (PGBS) 
performed in seven countries confirms that:  
 
[a]lthough the high-level negotiation and monitoring costs of PGBS are often 
perceived as onerous, there are large transaction cost savings for partner 
                                                                                                                                              
based on the principle of co-ordinated support for a locally owned programme of development, such as a 
national poverty reduction strategy, a sector programme, a thematic programme or a programme of a 
specific organisation’. PBAs share the following features: leadership by the host country or organisation; a 
single comprehensive programme and budget framework; a formalised process for donor co-ordination 
and harmonisation of donor procedures for reporting, budgeting, financial management and procurement; 
efforts to increase the use of local systems for programme design and implementation, financial 
management, monitoring and evaluation (Lavergne and Alba, 2003; quoted in OECD, 2006: 37). 
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countries during the implementation of PGBS-financed activities. The extent 
of transaction cost savings has been limited by the scale on which other 
modalities have continued in parallel. (IDD and Associates, 2006: S5) 
 
3 Aid transaction costs from the perspective of Transaction 
Cost Economics 
 
From the Sections above, we understand that the analysis of aid transaction costs has so 
far lacked a solid theoretical background. Existing definitions are various and vague, and 
do not enable precise identification of the costs. No effective methodology has been 
developed to measure them, and available evidence over their evolution is mixed. One 
also understands that the shift to programme approaches has partly been justified by an 
intention to reduce aid transaction costs. In order to be able to propose a generic definition 
of these costs and an analytical framework to evaluate when a change in aid modality is 
desirable, we first present the economic theory that seems most relevant to analyse our 
issue – that is, transaction cost economics. As a matter of fact, aid delivery is a transaction 
per se: donors transfer money and other inputs to a partner country and, in exchange, they 
expect to observe some results (such as poverty reduction, education, vaccination, etc.). 
Hence, transaction cost economics may be a useful tool for understanding how these costs 
can be minimised. We first introduce the main concepts of transaction cost economics, 
and then analyse aid modalities in terms of governance structures. 
 
3.1 Transaction cost economics 
 
This stream of economic theory was mainly developed by Oliver E. Williamson in the 
1970s, and then by Douglass North in the early 1990s. The theory aims to find the best 
way to organise a transaction of goods or services between two economic agents 
(Williamson, 1993: 16). The theory is grounded on the principle that the structure of 
governance chosen for the transaction should minimise transaction costs, in view of the 
fact that each transaction differs according to various characteristics. 
Transaction cost economics also relies on two main behavioural hypotheses that 
explain why the costs occur. The first hypothesis is bounded rationality, such that 
economic agents cannot predict precisely how the transaction will evolve. It implies that 
every contract is inherently incomplete. The second one is the risk of opportunism: 
because of the contract’s incompleteness, there is a risk that agents involved in the 
transaction take profit from the imperfect distribution of information. As a consequence 
of these two hypotheses, when a transaction takes place, the agents involved bear some 
costs for coping with contract incompleteness and the risk of opportunism. In the 
context of aid-recipient countries, these hypotheses may be interpreted in terms of 
corruption, sub-optimal behaviours (for example, implementation of programmes that 
do not address developmental priorities) and constraints in the relationship between 
donors and recipients (unnecessary monitoring procedures, conditionality, etc.). 
Transaction cost economics reckons that various structures of governance may be 
preferred, depending on the characteristics of each transaction. It distinguishes between 
three types of characteristics. (i) Asset specificity refers to whether the transaction 
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concerns non-standard goods that require specific investments that cannot be easily re-
used for other transactions (for example, producing a specific item can require the 
construction of a machine that will only produce this item) so that if the transaction 
ceases, the investment is lost. The impact of this characteristic on the choice of 
governance is obvious: when asset specificity is high, both parties should want to lead 
the transaction to a positive end – otherwise, the investments in the specific asset will be 
lost or devalued. In the context of foreign aid, investments in specific assets are 
probably high, because both recipient government and donors have to invest in the aid-
management process (for example, staff training, technical assistant provision, 
development of financial and reporting procedures, monitoring, etc.). (ii) Uncertainty: 
as information is always incomplete, agents cannot predict other agents’ performance. 
Following the principal-agent theory, information incompleteness can take the shape of 
moral hazard (one agent cannot assess the other agent’s effort/actions) or asymmetry 
(one agent has more information than the other). Because of such lack of transparency, 
the principal (donor) does not know precisely how the agent (recipient government) 
allocates and manages aid. Uncertainty increases transaction costs since it incites both 
parties to negotiate complex contracts and/or augment controlling costs. (iii) Frequency: 
as one may expect, the more frequently the transaction takes place, the more easily the 
costs of setting formal governance structures are recovered. 
 
3.2 Aid modalities and governance structures 
 
Relying on the above-mentioned behavioural hypotheses and transaction characteristics, 
transaction cost economics intends to design structures of governance that minimise 
transaction costs. Figure 1 presents an analytical framework that shows which 
governance structure is most adapted, depending on transactions characteristics. As 
explained below, we apply that framework to aid delivery and view aid modalities as 
governance structures. This enables us to analyse what aid modalities are preferred, 
according to the transaction characteristics. 
 














Source: Author’s adaptation of Williamson (1993: 52). 
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Figure 1 above is inspired by Williamson (1993: 52) and distinguishes three 
governance structures: the market, the firm, and hybrid structures, which are optimal 
according to the characteristics of the transaction (asset specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency). Williamson interpreted it as follows. Transactions taking place on the 
market generally concern non-specific goods. In fact, standard products provide both 
parts of the transaction with sufficient protection against opportunism, as the provider 
can easily be replaced if he does not respect his commitments. Thus, building a detailed 
contract that foresees the transaction’s evolution is not necessary. On the contrary, for 
those goods that have a very high level of asset specificity, both parts of the transaction 
have to protect themselves against the risk of transaction cancellation which would 
imply important ‘sunk costs’ (Williamson, 1993: 16). When uncertainty and/or 
transaction frequency are very high, it can be preferable to internalise the transactions 
into one economic unit: the firm. Yet, inevitably, such a structure of governance is 
costly to set up and entails management costs, which should not exceed the expected 
gains in terms of transaction costs. Between these two extreme cases (the market and 
the firm), the third case deals with those goods that have a relatively high level of 
specificity and thus require a contract stipulating the transaction expectations (nature of 
the item, quality, shipping details, etc.), but are not subject to frequent transactions, so 
that the costs induced by internalising the transaction into a firm would not be 
recovered. In this case, one would rather set up a contract that still encompasses costs, 
but that does not entail firm-management costs. So-called hybrid structures of 
governance may therefore be relevant. They present some of the characteristics of both 
the market and the firm. In practice, they take the form of all other types of contracts 
between two or more parties. 
Aid delivery, as with any transaction, generates some costs. The aforementioned 
rationale can therefore be applied to the aid-delivery system, where the intended use of 
aid funds by donors may be viewed as asset specificity, and where aid modalities may 
be viewed as governance structures. 
Aid transfers that are not associated with specific requirements with regard to the 
use of funds, and therefore do not entail specific management tools (conditionality, 
reform measures, indicators, monitoring processes, etc.) can easily be managed through 
a market-like governance structure; this situation can be assimilated with the balance-
of-payment support. However, donors – and governments – often attach a value as to 
how aid funds are used, and are ready to invest in further specific assets 
(conditionalities, experts, monitoring systems, etc.) to prevent aid from being 
misallocated by opportunism. According to transaction cost economics, such asset 
specificity associated with aid entails the non-market governance structure being 
optimal to minimise transaction costs. Following our analytical framework outlined in 
Figure 1, three cases may be encountered. When donors do not specify how aid funds 
should be allocated (so that the recipient government decides on how to use them) and 
therefore do not set up a specific ‘guarantees’ system, a hybrid contract appears to 
minimise aid transaction costs. When applied to our purpose, this situation can be 
assimilated with partnership budget support. When donors stipulate how the money 
should be allocated and frequently interact with the government on related matters, the 
corresponding hybrid structure of governance appears to be the programme-based 
approach (PBA), especially the sector-wide approach (SWAp). Finally, when donors 
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have such precise requirements regarding the use of aid funds that they prefer to manage 
them themselves, they can set up a firm-like hierarchical structure in order to control the 
transaction, under the form of a project. 
This analytical framework thus gives some theoretical prediction of which 
governance structure – or aid modality – minimises aid transaction costs, according to 
the transaction characteristics. We shall rely on it in order to determine when a change 
in aid modality is worthwhile. Indeed, different aid management structures are 
associated with different transaction costs, but the question as to which is the most 
appropriate is not straightforward, since it depends on country specificities and the 
value of different aid characteristics. For instance, it is often argued that programme aid 
and budget support should be associated with less transaction costs than a multiplication 
of projects, as they promote donor co-ordination, harmonisation and alignment. 
However, this has not been formally proved, all the more since they entail new types of 
costs in the form of co-ordination costs, development of a common monitoring system, 
capacity-building, etc. As Killick (2004: 19) points out, ‘the superiority of programme 
aid in this respect remains only a hypothesis because it rests on a presumption of the 
comparative costs of the respective aid modalities, which has not, so far as is known, 
been empirically established in any systematic way’. In order to assess whether one 
modality generates fewer costs than others, we hereafter extend the intuitions of 
transaction cost economics into a formal model. Our aim is thus to identify which 
modality is preferred – in term of cost minimisation – according to the aid transaction’s 
characteristics. In other words, we aim to assess whether a change in aid modality is 
worth it in order to reduce transaction costs. Before that, we start by better defining aid 
transaction costs by using the background of transaction cost economics, as addressed in 
Section 4. 
 
4 Defining and estimating aid transaction costs 
 
4.1 Aid transaction costs: what they are, what they are not 
 
As already mentioned, there is no universal definition of aid transaction costs. A narrow 
vision can restrict them to ‘direct transaction costs’ (Acharya et al., 2006) or 
‘administrative costs of aid’, including only the ‘costs of transferring aid from donors to 
recipients and those of planning aid and monitoring its progress and impact’ (OECD, 
2003: 114). However, most authors agree on the fact that aid transaction costs 
encompass a much broader reality. 
On the theoretical side as well, the definition of transaction costs is elusive (Allen, 
1999). For example, R. Coase, known as the pioneer of transaction cost economics 
(TCE), never actually used the term transaction cost explicitly in his first major article 
(‘The Nature of the Firm’, 1937). He was rather referring to general concepts such as 
‘the costs of using the price mechanism’ or ‘the cost of carrying out a transaction by 
means of an exchange on the open market’. Any transaction generates such costs 
because, as Coase (1961: 15) explains, ‘[i]n order to carry out a market transaction it is 
necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one 
wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to 
12 Frieda Vandeninden and Elisabeth Paul 
 
 
 © The Authors 2012. Development Policy Review © 2012 Overseas Development Institute. 
Development Policy Review 30 (3)  
draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of 
the contract are being observed, and so on’. One of the first appearances of the term 
‘transaction costs’ is to be found in Arrow (1969: 48), who defined transaction costs as 
‘the cost of running the economic system’. Williamson (1985: 19) then compares the 
transaction costs to the frictions in physical science. They are all the ‘extra costs’ 
generated from market imperfections. Even if the concept of transaction cost is defined 
quite vaguely, it still seems clear from the above that transaction costs are sunk costs, 
and differ in that respect from production costs. 
We believe that this distinction between transaction and production costs is critical 
in order to reach a satisfactory ‘economic’ (rather than general) definition of aid 
transaction costs.3 In fact, some activities generating so-called transaction costs (for 
example, donor-government co-ordination meetings) also generate positive externalities 
such as learning from working groups, mitigating risks through fiduciary safeguards 
(EuropeAid, 2007: 27), bringing about additional technical expertise for national 
policies, trust and capacity-building, etc. Such transaction costs may be actually viewed 
as ‘investment’ costs and should not be confused with ‘net’ or ‘sunk’ costs emanating 
from the mere transfer and management of aid that encompass efficiency losses. Let us 
note from the start that most aid modalities are associated with some investment costs, 
but that the latter are probably higher when they are run on a large scale – such as PBA. 
Therefore, we propose to distinguish between gross and net transaction costs, in the 
following way: 
 
GATC = IC + NATC                   (1) 
 
where GATC is Gross Aid Transaction Costs; IC: Investment Costs; and NATC: Net 
Aid Transaction Costs. 
According to that distinction, we propose to define net aid transaction costs as all 
the economic costs associated with aid management that do not add any value to the aid 
transaction. It is noticeable that only the net transaction costs reduce aid effectiveness 
and should therefore be minimised (see below). In fact, assessing the effectiveness of 
aid delivery requires looking at the final aid envelope available for the production of a 
developmental programme – that is, the total amount of aid minus net transaction costs. 
 
NAV = GA – NATC                   (2) 
 
where NAV is Net Aid Value; and GA: Gross Aid. 
What we called aid investment costs (which may erroneously be commonly termed 
transaction costs) may actually increase the net aid value, because they contribute to 
producing positive externalities. These investment costs may improve information, help 
build common knowledge, systems and trust, and therefore reduce uncertainty and 
contribute to decreasing the net transaction costs for future transactions. 
The economic meaning of aid transaction costs deserves more precision. 
Regarding the nature of costs, it goes without saying that transaction costs are not 
                                                          
3. Thus we fully agree with Lawson (2009) who specifies that transaction costs ‘add nothing to the actual 
value of that transaction’. 
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merely financial, but should be viewed as opportunity costs (that is, the value of the best 
alternatives that have been given up for the utilisation of a particular resource). They 
thus encompass the value of time, perverse effects on civil servants’ behaviour, missed 
opportunities in terms of resource allocation, etc. Besides, Transaction Cost Economics 
rests on the assumption of limited rationality and opportunism, which lead to 
informational imbalances and are therefore very similar to the hypothesis of incomplete 
information in the principal-agent theory. The aid delivery system is indeed 
characterised by a chain of principal-agent relationships subject to information 
asymmetry (Martens et al., 2002; Paul, 2006). For instance, donors may be viewed as 
principals delegating tasks (for example, the realisation of a project or developmental 
programme) to the recipient government (viewed as the agent); other principal-agent 
relationships may also be identified in the aid delivery system, notably between donor 
agencies’ main office and country offices, the Cabinet or Ministry of Finance and sector 
agencies, etc. Within each principal-agent relationship, the acting agent is often better 
informed than its principal, certainly regarding the working environment and its own 
effort or characteristics. The fungibility of aid funds further complicates the 
informational problem and means that donors cannot be sure that their funds have 
effectively been used for the intended purpose, unless they have a view of the whole 
spending programme of the government.4 These informational imbalances are known to 
lead to so-called adverse selection and moral hazard problems that create additional 
costs for the principal. In the context of aid management, a major type of agency cost 
encountered deals with all the costs associated with the additional controls and 
incentives set up by donors in order to induce recipient agents into acting in the desired 
way (for example, conditionality, financial controls and reporting). Another type of cost 
considered in the principal-agent literature is the economic cost of distortions from an 
ideal, perfect information-resource allocation; this relates, for instance, to over-
investment in some sectors or regions preferred by donors. Our definition of aid 
transaction costs allows taking account of such agency costs. 
In concrete terms, there are different varieties of aid transaction costs, which may 
be differentiated according to several classification criteria, as detailed below. 
 
• Timing of cost occurrence. According to Williamson (1985), there are two 
kinds of transaction costs: (i) ex-ante costs of drafting, negotiating, and 
safeguarding an agreement; these costs can be further divided into search costs 
and contracting costs; and (ii) ex-post costs of haggling, governance, and 
bonding to secure commitments; these costs can also be divided into 
monitoring and enforcement costs. In practice, aid transaction costs may occur 
at three stages of aid delivery: ex-ante (identification, negotiation and 
programming of aid programmes), during implementation (financial transfers, 
ongoing donor-government dialogue, project-management unit, procurement, 
monitoring), or ex-post (specific audits and evaluations). 
                                                          
4. The problem of aid fungibility arises when foreign aid earmarked for particular sectors is substituted for 
spending that recipient governments would have undertaken anyway, so that the aid funds are used to relax 
the government’s budgetary constraint. Research shows that aid is fungible, at least in certain countries 
and sectors (Devarajan and Swaroop, 1998). 
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• Who bears the costs? Aid transaction costs can be borne by donors and 
recipients. In the first case, they decrease the amount of resources that can be 
transferred to partner countries, and in the second case, they consume domestic 
resources that could have been valuable for alternative uses. 
• Net versus gross costs. As already mentioned, we have to distinguish the mere 
efficiency losses – the net costs – from the gross costs that also encompass 
investment costs. The latter produce some positive externalities on the 
transaction (improving co-ordination, information, trust and capacity-building) 
and are expected to foster a decrease in future net transaction costs over the 
medium run. 
 
4.2 Estimating aid transaction costs 
 
As noted above, precisely measuring transaction costs requires a lot of quantitative and 
qualitative data and still remains a challenge. Most authors have attempted to evaluate 
their evolution using some proxy indicators and/or interviews.5 However, this 
methodology does not seem to work very effectively because it lacks a theoretical 
background enabling identification of what should and should not be reduced. Indeed, 
as already mentioned, some ‘investment’ costs associated with aid management actually 
help to decrease net transaction costs. Moreover, one should also be aware that the 
transaction costs incurred are related to the transaction’s characteristics. 
The simple model developed here shows that cost minimisation, and henceforth 
the choice of an aid modality, depends on the transaction’s characteristics. It enables the 
following crucial question to be answered: when is a change in aid modality 
worthwhile? 
Let the index r stand for the recipient government, and d = 1, … , n for the n 
donors. We first specify transaction costs over one period t. The recipient government 
and each donor bear different transaction costs according to the transaction’s 
characteristics. It is important to note that a number of factors influence the level of 
transaction costs: the number of donors active in the country and their degree of co-
ordination, harmonisation and alignment over the recipient government’s procedures; 
but also some characteristics that can be related to TCE theory and more specifically to 
Figure 1: the governance system in the recipient country (which influences the degree of 
uncertainty), and donors’ possible specifications over the indented use of funds (which 
relates to asset specificity), such as the frequency of transactions (see below). Let us 
also recall that, following equation (1), we distinguish pure efficiency losses (NATC) 
from investment costs (IC). 
The first step to understanding how to choose an optimal aid modality is to 
identify the links between the Gross Aid Transaction Costs (GATC) and the different 
characteristics of the transaction over a single period. The GATC ( GATCr  and 
                                                          
5. This exercise is beyond the scope of this article, which is limited to putting forward a more accurate 
conceptual framework for comparing transaction costs between different aid modalities. For more 
indications on how to measure transaction costs, see, for instance, Jobin (2008), who proposes a number of 
evaluation questions as well as a transaction-cost measurement framework based on surveys aimed at 
asking interviewees to assess different dimensions of transactions. Lawson (2009) also proposes some 
measurement tools and models of questionnaires. 
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GATCd=1, … , n for the recipient government and donors respectively) are the sum of 
investment costs – which are a function of the degree of harmonisation between donors, 
among other country-specific factors that are not incorporated in the model6 – and net 
transaction costs – which are a function of the degree of uncertainty and the level of 
asset specificity. Note also that donors are likely to be heterogeneous, so that, from the 
government’s perspective, different donors will be associated with different costs. Let 
us define: 
 
On the recipient government’s side,  
 
GATCr = ICr ,d (h) + NATCr ,d (s,u,h) 
d =1
n            (3) 
 
On the donors’ side, 
 
GATCd = (1,...,n ) = ICd (h) + NATCd (s,u,h)[ ]
d =1
n
            
(4) 
 
So that the (total) gross aid transaction cost (GATC) for period t is the sum of recipient 
and donors’ costs: 
 
GATC = GATCd =1,...,n + GATCr                  (5) 
 
where s represents the level of asset specificity, u the degree of uncertainty and h the 
degree of harmonisation between donors, with h=1 if they fully harmonise their 
procedures and h=n if there is no harmonisation at all. In fact, if harmonisation is 
perfect, it is like all donors forming a single donor. 
This model is further specified to render the following characteristics. For both 
donors and recipients, NATCs are an increasing function in s (δNATC/δs > 0). In fact, 
when donors have specific requirements about how aid should be allocated, they need to 
build a ‘guarantees’ system to ensure aid earmarking, which increases transaction costs. 
If donors align their aid on the recipient government’s policies and systems, asset 
specificity decreases to zero, which in turn decreases NATCs. The same relationship 
applies to the degree of uncertainty: the more information asymmetry there is between 
donors and the recipient country, the more donors require guarantees, which increases 
NATC (δNATC/δu > 0).7 
The degree of harmonisation between donors also influences transaction costs. 
Logically, the more donors are harmonised, the less time-consuming day-to-day 
interaction with them is for the government (δNATCr/δh < 0). But usually, all the 
necessary prerequisites for harmonising donor practices (notably in the context of a 
PBA) incur investment costs, for instance to create special financing and monitoring 
                                                          
6. Investment costs depend mostly on harmonisation as the more donors are harmonised, the less costs they 
impose on the recipient country. However, at constant harmonisation level, investment costs could be 
higher in countries where initial conditions are worse than in others (for example, a recipient country with 
very poor institutional capacities and a lot of fragmented donors). But in order to keep the model simple, 
we consider investment costs as a function of harmonisation only. 
7. This assumption is supported by Jobin (2008: 452) who provides numerous references indicating that trust 
among partners plays a critical role in partnership performance, and that trust can reduce transaction costs. 
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procedures and/or improving national ones, that may lead to an important (non-linear) 
‘jump’ in ICs. Moreover, day-to-day co-ordination is also demanding for both donors 
and government, and the effect of harmonisation over NATCd is less obvious to assess, 
and probably differs from one donor to another. Figure 2 gives an idea of the evolution 
of transaction costs with the degree of harmonisation. In this setting, harmonisation 
decreases NATCs to a certain extent, but it should not be pursued beyond a certain point 
where the gain in NATC reduction no longer balances necessary investment costs. 
 
















Equations (3) and (4) thus represent how the GATCs are affected by the various 
aid transaction characteristics, over a single period, without taking into account that aid 
transfers may occur over several periods. Still, from these static equations, one may 
already draw an important conclusion: because (per definition) the aid relationship is 
always characterised by uncertainty (cf. the principal-agent theory) and because, in most 
cases, donors value at least some asset specificity, any aid transaction necessarily 
encompasses some NATCs. 
Furthermore, in order to understand which aid modality is preferable, one should 
be aware that aid transactions generally occur over several periods (that is, in the 
language of TCE, with a certain frequency). For instance, a one-shot project may be 
implemented during one or a few months, whereas the development of a sector requires 
continuous interaction over many years (high frequency). When taking account of 
frequency in our model, where t=1,…,T, one should be aware that the different 
transaction characteristics are most likely to influence each other. More specifically, it is 
reasonable to assume that harmonisation progressively enables the reduction of 
uncertainty through sharing information and building trust and common understanding 
between partners. Therefore, we assume that ut+1 is decreasing in h (δut+1/δht < 0) and, 
consequently, current investments in harmonisation reduce future NATCs: δNATCt+1/δht 
< 0. 
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4.3 Minimising aid transaction costs 
 
When assuming that aid effectiveness depends on transaction costs, two questions really 
matter: (i) is it possible to reduce transaction costs in the current framework; and (ii) 
could another aid modality do better? For instance, it is worth wondering whether 
shifting from a project approach to a PBA could improve aid effectiveness by 
decreasing transaction costs. It seems straightforward that a shift to a PBA should be 
made only if the associated reduction in NATCs at least compensates for the additional 
ICs incurred in creating the necessary conditions for alignment and harmonisation. In 
other words, one should compare the net present value (NPV) of the two proposed aid 
modalities, including additional IC and NATC savings due to a shift in aid modality. 
This is represented in equation (6): 
 
  ( ) ( )1 1
1 1
( ) ( , , , ) ( ) ( , , , )
(1 ) (1 )
T T
t t t t t t t t
t t
t t




   + +
≤   
+ +       
 
with r standing for the discount rate, ICt(h) being increasing in h while tNATC  is 
decreasing in both h  and ht −1  and increasing in u and s. In this dynamic model, 
harmonisation plays a double role in reducing NATCs. First, over a single period, one 
may reasonably assume that the more harmonisation, the less transaction costs are 
necessary to manage the aid relationship, but over several periods, we have argued that 
harmonisation enables us to build capacities, trust and common systems that can further 
reduce uncertainty, so that the curve of NATCs will probably decrease in a sharper way 
with harmonisation, as illustrated in Figure 3 below. If this assumption is valid, contrary 
to the static model where harmonisation was not desirable beyond a certain point, we 
now observe that the more harmonisation (and related efforts and system strengthening), 
the less long-term transaction costs. 
 
Figure 3: Likely evolution of transaction costs  
with harmonisation (dynamic model) 
        
     Costs 
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This simple model does not resolve the measurement problem of aid transaction 
costs: we do not put forward any other option than assessing them using proxy indicators. 
Yet, our model enables to assess how transaction costs are influenced by the transaction’s 
characteristics, and formalises the difference between investment costs and net aid 
transaction costs. Therefore, it proposes to shift the effort from measuring transaction 
costs to assessing the value of different aid modalities according to the characteristics of 
the transaction. Equation (6) also illustrates the fact that if uncertainty and asset specificity 
are high, it is less likely that the change from a project approach to a PBA or budget 
support might compensate for the required investment costs. Similarly, if a PBA is 
adopted but donors lag behind in harmonising procedures, the expected benefits in 
reducing NATCs may not be sufficient to compensate for the investment costs. This 
supports anecdotal evidence indicating that the reduction of aid transaction costs after a 
change to budget support or PBA may not be as high as expected, at least in the beginning 
of the process. Hence the utility of our dynamic model that enables taking account of the 
long-term effects of investment costs (harmonisation) over transaction characteristics. 
To sum up, transaction costs are ineluctable and inherent in the aid transaction. 
Investment costs are especially high when setting up a new aid modality, while NATCs 
are a consequence of imperfect information and the risk of opportunism (remember the 
behavioural hypotheses outlined in Sub-section 3.1). One should also remember that, 
when assessing the evolution of aid transaction costs, these often occur over several 
periods/years, so that it is important to evaluate their potential change on a longer time 
horizon. The model presented above enables us to render interesting features of the 
evolution of aid transaction costs according to the context and transaction 
characteristics. The main conclusions are summarised in Box 1. 
 
Box 1: Evolution of aid transaction costs and impact of the choice of an aid 
modality according to the transaction characteristics 
 
• NATCs increase when asset specificity is high, that is, when donors are not perfectly aligned 
with the recipient’s policies and require some guarantee over the intended use of aid; in such 
a case, a project may be more cost-effective than a PBA. 
• Uncertainty, which is notably due to information asymmetry between partners, raises 
NATCs; yet some ICs (for instance in the context of increased co-ordination and 
harmonisation between donors) may help decrease future uncertainty, and therefore 
subsequent NATCs; thus, the costs of setting up a PBA may be recovered after some time. 
• Harmonisation has two opposite effects on transaction costs: it is likely to increase ICs since 
it requires setting up new ways of working together; but it presumably reduces the NATCs 
borne by the recipient government (the effect on the NATCs borne by donors is not 
straightforward); hence, the decision to shift to a PBA may be influenced by comparing these 
two types of costs. 
• Frequency should also influence the choice of an aid modality because when the interaction 
between donors and the recipient government is frequent (for instance, long-term 
development programmes in the health or education sectors), ICs incurred to manage the 
relationship (for example, to set up a PBA) are expected to be recovered after some time, so 
that their impact on the reduction of NATCs will be more consequent, while one-shot 
interventions (for example, the construction of a unique facility) are probably better managed 
through a project. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
The Paris Agenda aimed at enhancing aid effectiveness was designed as a way of 
responding to the project-approach deficiencies, especially in a context of increasing 
donor fragmentation. Among other objectives, the Paris Agenda aims to reduce the 
transaction costs associated with aid delivery by aligning domestic programmes and 
systems, and by using new financing and management modalities, such as PBA/SWAp 
and budget support. 
Recognising that the concept of aid transaction costs – even if commonly used by 
practitioners – has hardly been defined or measured, this article aims to develop a 
theoretical background to the concept by analysing it in relation to Transaction Cost 
Economics. The definition of aid transaction costs put forward rests on the concept of 
opportunity cost, and emphasises the fact that ‘true’ transaction costs are ‘net’ costs – 
that is, they should not take account of ‘investments’ activities adding value to the 
outcomes of aid. We thus propose an analytical framework that allows comparing how 
they vary with different aid modalities, according to the context and characteristics of 
the aid transaction. 
The minimisation of transaction costs is often advanced as an important aspect of 
aid effectiveness. However, our definition and the model above help to explain that the 
optimal aid modality (governance structure) depends on the characteristics of the 
transaction – for example, on the relation between a particular donor and the recipient 
government, and their respective preferences as to the allocation of the aid. The optimal 
governance structure may still generate a lot of costs (at least in the short run) and is 
likely to change if the characteristics of the transaction also change. In particular, the 
investment costs associated with a PBA can play an important role in reducing 
information asymmetry and in bringing donors’ and government’s preferences closer to 
each other. Yet, it is probably mistaken to adopt a PBA if donors are not ready to 
harmonise their procedures or are not numerous from the start. Therefore, the 
minimisation of ‘apparent’ aid transaction costs should not be an end in itself. For 
instance, if donors really disagree with the development programme of the recipient 
government, which leads to high asset specificity and the need to set up guarantees for 
the utilisation of the aid, the project approach could be preferred. Note also that donors 
are likely to be heterogeneous, so that it may be worth setting up a PBA (with increased 
co-ordination and harmonisation) for a number of ‘traditional’ donors, while some 
specific donors might do better continuing with the project approach. 
In conclusion, this article demonstrates that Transaction Cost Economics is an 
assessment of the conditions under which new aid modalities (such as PBAs) are likely 
to reduce transaction costs and henceforth improve aid effectiveness. 
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